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Abstract : This article presents both theoretical and empirical ndings in
the eld of optimal local taxation i.e neutral in locational decision. This topic
should throw light on the question of tax policy and tax reform. We extend
Wildasins (1987) model, including mobile capital. In this way, we include
his marginal cost of congestion taxation rule relating to mobile households
(proposition 1). This extension provides us with a new rule (proposition 2):
the optimal share-out of taxes among household residents and rms in mu-
nicipalities. To illustrate these results, we discuss the French municipal tax
system properties and we pick out its main distortions.
1 Introduction
Tax incidence and the question of optimal taxation are important topics
for economic analysis. (see Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirlees (1971)
or Slemrod (1990) concerning main traditional results). More recently, tax
incidence has been the subject of many applied studies (see Sundar C. and
al (2000) about taxes on capital gains, Castaener and al (2004) or Thurston
(2002) on the subject of personal income tax, Giosa and De Pieneres (1999)
concerning factor prices distortions resulting from trade tax policies).
Here, we focus on the valuation of local taxation. Traditionally, in tax
incidence theory, territories are treated as closed. By contrast, in local public
economics, the openness of the jurisdictions plays a major part. In this
article, factors and population freely ow across jurisdictions. Indeed, capital
tax e¤ects on investment are neglected. Further, the total supply of capital
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in the economy is supposed xed. Finally, we search the local tax structure
causing no distortions or neutral in location decisions, i.e. which will be
considered as justied by mobile taxpayers. They will not have incentives to
migrate.
This article is organized around two sections. The rst section mod-
els how local government tax policy a¤ects the locational choices of mobile
factors across jurisdictions, and we ask under what conditions these poli-
cies lead to an e¢ cient equilibrium. The model extends Wildasins analysis
(1987) including mobile capital across jurisdictions. In this way, we are able
to distinguish between the congestion costs, due to household and produc-
tion activity. First, we recall the marginal cost of congestion taxation rule,
also developed by Wildasin (1987). Furthermore, we are also able to discuss
a major new topic: the optimal share-out of taxation among household resi-
dents and capital owners in municipalities. The second section discusses the
French municipal taxes in the light of the above theoretical results.
2 Model of the locational assignment of fac-
tors.
The fundamental goal of this section is to understand how local government
taxes a¤ect resource allocation. We undertake three steps. The rst one
is to specify the e¢ cient assignment of the two mobile factors to localities.
In the second one, we dene the corresponding equilibrium conditions. To
nish, we compare the previous results to establish the conditions under
which the locational equilibrium will be e¢ cient. The e¢ ciency depends
on the structure of municipal taxes: If taxes are set appropriately, they will
generate no distortions and mobile factors will not have incentives to migrate
in order to avoid paying taxes.
2.1 Locational e¢ ciency
Let us assume there is a xed number of municipalitiesM = 2; within which
factors (capital and household workers) are mobile: Each locality provides
a xed amount of homogeneous land Ti: N stands for the total household
2
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population and K for the total capital supply to be invested in the economy.
We suppose that all household taxpayers are identical (in tastes and endow-
ment), so the government need not be concerned with questions of vertical
or horizontal equity. See for example Moreland (2004) upon the question of
optimal income tax rates level when wages rates di¤er.
Each unit of capital ki and labor ni are employed in only one locality
(see (2) and (3)). Let Fi(ni; ki; Ti; gi) be a well-behaved constant returns to
scale production function for the jurisdiction i to produce a single private
numeraire good xi and local public services. Equation (1) establishes full-
employment of private production. Let U(xi; gi) be the utility function of a
household resident in locality i, which depends on its private consumption
and on the local public services.
Each jurisdiction provides some public services Gi which are consumed
by residents and jointly used with capital in the production process. Public
goods exhibit congestion when the total amount provided by the local gov-
ernment (G) di¤ers from the level actually consumed at the individual level
(g), i.e. when n > 0 and k > 0 : g = Gnnkk : The degree of residential
congestion is measured by n (respectively k for industrial congestion). To
produce Gi units of local public goods, we need Ci(Gi; ni; ki) units of nu-
meraire. Then, considering the mobile factor ni for instance, when @Ci@ni = 0;
the local public good is pure. By contrast, when the corresponding marginal
congestion cost @Ci
@ni
> 0; then the local public good is subject to congestion
or impure. The term @Ci
@ni
> 0 (or equally @Ci
@ki
> 0) means that additional
local public spending is required if public servicesusers marginally increase,
with a given individual level g.
Several conditions must be satised to reach an e¢ cient allocation of
resources. As for a closed economy, markets for goods and factors must be
e¢ cient as well as the public goods provision. Furthermore, in our system
of open economy, mobile factors and households must also be assigned in an
e¢ cient way. All in all, locational e¢ ciency conditions can be derived from
the following maximization problem :
Max U1(x1; g1) u:c:
8>>>><>>>>:
Ui(xi; gi) = U1(x1; g1); i = 2::M
(1)
nP
i=1
[Fi(ni; ki; Ti; gi)  nixi   Ci(ni; ki; Gi)] = 0
(2) N  Pi ni = 0
(3) K  Pi ki = 0
3
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First-order conditions lead to the following equations (; ;  and  are
Lagrange multipliers):
(4) @U1
@x1
 Pi6=1 i @U1@x1   = 0
(5) i @Ui@xi   = 0 i = 2:::N
(6)  xi @Ci@ni +@Fi@ni   = 0
(7)  @Ci
@ki
+@Fi
@ki
  = 0
(8) i @Ui@gi +
@Fi
@gi
  @Ci
@Gi
@Gi
@gi
= 0
Condition (6) implies that @Fi
@ni
  xi   @Ci@ni =
@Fj
@nj
  xj   @Cj@nj and de-
scribes the e¢ cient distribution of population. E¢ ciency is achieved when
the marginal productivity of labor, minus the private consumption and the
marginal congestion cost that households impose, is equalized everywhere in
the economy. The same condition holds where there is mobile capital used
jointly with labor and public goods in the production process: the e¢ cient
distribution of capital condition (7) means that the additional output, ob-
tained by adding one more capital unit in the local production process net
of the corresponding marginal crowding costs, must be equated across juris-
dictions. To nish, combining (5) with (8) leads to the condition for e¢ cient
public expenditure.
We have now depicted the locational e¢ ciency conditions; we still have
to discuss the competitive equilibrium conditions for this economy.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium
Here, we describe the agentsbehavior in our economy. Firms maximize their
prots in competitive markets. Furthermore, two budget constraints (one for
the local government and one for the representative household resident) are
depicted.
Each jurisdiction raises revenue by levying various kinds of local taxes:
tax on land rents (ri ), on capital returns (
k
i ); and residential head taxes
(ni ). Then, the balanced-budget constraint for municipality i is:
(9) C(ni; ki; Gi) = nini + 
r
i riTi + 
k
i ski
Indeed, households are equally endowed with ownership of the land and
capital, outside of the locality of residence (j 6= i). Then, in locality j, land
4
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rents denoted rjTj and net return of capital skj are taxed at source. Then,
the budget constraint for a household in jurisdiction i can be written:
(10) xi = wi   ni +
P
j(1  rj)rj TjN +
P
j s
Kj
N
= wi   ni + 
The individual capital share (respectively land share) is supposed to be
Kj
N
(
Tj
N
) and wi represents the gross local wage. Let us denote as  the total
income stemming from land and nancial investments.
Prot maximization by local competitive rms leads to the following three
conditions :
(11) wi = @Fi@ni
(12) ri = @Fi@Ti
(13) (1 + ki )s =
@Fi
@ki
To reach an e¢ cient competitive equilibrium, one must satisfy the two
locational e¢ ciency conditions for mobile capital (7) and labor (6). Loca-
tional e¢ ciency can be achieved for mobile households in the economy if we
combine equations (6) with (10) and (11) to obtain :
(14) @Fi
@ni
  xi   ni =  
Finally, as total income investment is the same in all the jurisdictions,
with a special value equal to  

; the local head tax on mobile households must
equal the corresponding marginal cost of congestion: ni =
@Ci
@ni
: Conversely
when public services are pure, the optimal tax level on mobile households is
then equal to zero. Identically, combining (7) with (13) leads to the second
e¢ cient equilibrium condition:
(15) (1 + ki )s  @Ci@ki =


If s = 

is an unchanging value in all the jurisdictions, we obtain the
e¢ cient capital taxation level: ki s =
@Ci
@ki
:
Finally, the conditions necessary for locational e¢ ciency are summarized
in the two following propositions:
5
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Proposition 1 The marginal cost of congestion taxation rule, Wildasin
(1987) :
When public goods exhibit congestion, the marginal cost of congestion @Ci
@ni
is an e¢ cient taxation level to internalize congestion externality, that is to
say the cost of providing the extra public good to maintain individual public
services when faced by an expanded household population. With expenditure
held xed, an increase in the number of public users, necessarily mobile,
causes a deterioration of public services, which must be internalized to reach
an e¢ cient solution. If local public goods are pure, e¢ ciency does not require
the taxation of mobile residents. Whatever the nature of local public goods,
land rent taxation is justied, setting ri so as to satisfy (9). Several authors
including Arnott and Stiglitz (1979), and then Yinger (1982) have shown that
land rent taxation is e¢ cient because public services increase land value by a
capitalization e¤ect.
Proposition 2 The optimal share-out of taxes among mobile house-
hold residents and capital owners
The same rule must be applied to mobile capital as long as production
jointly employs public services and generates crowding e¤ects. All in all,
an e¢ cient local taxation requires one to distinguish and measure exactly
the marginal cost of congestion from the two di¤erent mobile users of public
goods. In other words, we must share precisely the tax pressure between capital
owners and household residents to internalize the cost of congestion induced
respectively by each kind of public services user.
All in all, many kinds of taxes could potentially play the role of an e¢ cient
tax to internalize congestion, irrespective of the tax base denition. The
marginal cost of congestion taxation rule only requires consideration of the
amount of tax paid. Each household and each owner of one unit of capital
must pay the local authority a total amount equal to the cost of providing
the extra public good to maintain individual public services when faced by
an expanded public services user.
We have now established the e¢ cient local taxation rules, and we now
need to discuss the properties of the French municipal taxes. The French pub-
lic sector has two major hierarchical levels: central government and local (so
called territorial) authorities. The latter can be divided into three, although
6
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interrelated, tiers whose lowest level is the municipality. We concentrate on
that nal jurisdiction here.
3 French municipal tax distortions
The two main forms of municipal taxation on household residents in France
include Taxe dHabitation (TH) and Taxe Foncière Bâtie (TFB) due from
building occupants and landlords respectively. They are proportional to the
property and renting values assessed by the land registry. The local business
tax called Taxe professionnelle (TP) is paid by rms based in the munic-
ipality. This tax is calculated on the whole value of tangible assets, that
is to say the value of capital (including buildings). Lastly, the tax on land
property is the Taxe Foncière non Bâtie (TFNB). To discuss the optimality
of this tax system, we will rst discuss proposition 2, to see if the French
municipal tax system is consistent with an optimal spreading of taxes among
mobile household residents and capital owners. Next, we examine whether
the French local taxes match the marginal cost of congestion taxation rule.
3.1 Optimal spreading of taxes among mobile house-
hold residents and capital owners
Most empirical studies show that local public services exhibit a high degree of
congestion (see Borcherding and Deacon (1972)). In France, similar conclu-
sions are reached in Guengant, Josselin and Rocaboy (1995, 2002). However,
to illustrate the application of Proposition 2, we must focus our attention
on particular studies which include two di¤erent sources of crowding e¤ects:
mobile household residents and capital or rmsproduction activity. To our
knowledge, this kind of analysis is rare, probably because relevant data to
measure capital is not easy to collect. In France, only two contributions can
be used even if they are not fully satisfactory.
In Guengant, Josselin and Rocaboy (1995), production activity conges-
tion is assessed by temporary labor migration in the municipality. Their
study uses a set of 799 French municipalities of at least 10,000 inhabitants.
They estimate a specication similar to Borcherding and Deacons formula-
tion. Using a similar methodology, Guengant (1992) gets comparable results:
7
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congestion costs induced by household residents is preponderant with a con-
gestion elasticity equal to 0.8 (respectively 0.2 for rms activity). All in all,
despite the imperfect measure of congestion from production activity, these
studies show that tax on mobile household resident should be predominant.
We now focus on the share of local tax receipts for the numerous munic-
ipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants; relevant values are shown in table
1.
Table 1. Tax receipts (per capita) by population size, 1996
share of receipts - 700 700-2,000 2,000-5,000 5,000-10,000 whole
TFB 27% 28% 28% 28% 28%
TFNB 23% 10% 4% 2% 7%
TH 23% 24% 22% 22% 23%
TP 28% 38% 46% 48% 42%
M 25249 6908 2655 898 35710
M is the number of municipalities. TP tax receipts for the municipalities
of at least 10,000 inhabitants are presented in the table below:
Table 2: TP tax receipts by population size, 1996
10-20,000 20-50,000 50-100,000 100-300,000 +300,000 whole
TP 47,9% 47,5% 50,3% 44,9% 37,2% 46,8%
N 470 306 70 33 4 883
Among these local taxes, TP ranks rst giving the highest revenue ( more
than 40% in most of these municipalities). Tax on building occupants (TH),
compared to mobile household residents is smaller (between 20 and 25%),
which seems to refute the optimal spreading of taxes principle.
3.2 French municipal taxes and the marginal conges-
tion cost rule
To assess the main four French municipal taxes in the light of proposition 1,
we rst discuss their tax base. Furthermore, we also propose to work out the
optimal tax paid by mobile taxpayers in a set of small French municipalities.
8
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3.2.1 French municipal tax bases
According to Wildasin (1987) locational e¢ ciency requires the use of a land
rent taxation, paid by immobile landlords. The basis on which TFB and
TFNB are currently assessed on building and land values dates from land
registry computation of the 1970s. These tax bases no longer reect todays
land and building monetary values. Therefore, they are not proportional to
the current rent return and di¤er from the e¢ cient taxation rule.
Until 1999, the business tax TP was set at 18% of total wages, plus the
whole value of tangible assets (that is to say building and capital values used
in the production process). The 1999 tax reform consisted in removing total
wages from the tax base. From then on, only the use of capital was included
in TP, excluding production activity congestion assessed by temporary labor
migration in the municipality. This tax reform, on account of employment,
still seems to move away from the e¢ cient taxation rule which consists in
internalizing all congestion costs due to local production.
3.2.2 Optimal taxation of mobile household municipal taxpayers
The optimal taxation level which must be levied on mobile municipal tax-
payers can easily be computed using a congestion specication similar to
Borcherding and Deacon (1972), which includes all sources of congestion :
(16) f(N;A;K) = N nA AK k
where N , A and K measure respectively total household population,
working people residing temporarily and capital units invested in the mu-
nicipality. In this way we identify all public services users. One alternative
model of congestion is often used in the literature. As suggested by Edwards
(1980) or De Mello (2002), the Camaraderie e¤ect means that there may
be a population level where sharing congestible goods increases benets to
each user until these are eroded by crowding. But these studies cant be used
here because the corresponding estimates only include residential crowding
e¤ects.
Consequently, the public spending level actually consumed at the indi-
vidual level can be written:
9
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(17) g = N nA AK kG
Thus, we can deduce the e¢ cient taxation level upon mobile residents
as the cost of providing the extra public good to maintain individual public
services in the face of an expanded user population :
@G
@N
= n
N
G
This e¢ cient level can be compared to the TH (taxe dhabitation) actually
paid by building occupants in a sample of 32 small French municipalities
belonging to the same suburban area in 1996. Thus this constitutes a quite
relevant sample of municipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants. Data have
been taken from AUDIAR (Greater Rennes Inter-Municipality Development
Agency) and o¤er a detailed measurement of variables.
Results appear in the table given in appendix. The rst columns give the
e¢ cient tax levels with di¤erent xed values for the congestion parameter
n: G is measured according to the total expenditure in each jurisdiction
used by the total household population settled in the municipality. Column
TH gives the average amount paid in each municipality. However, in France
more than 20 % of building occupants are tax-exempt and nearly 30% enjoy
partial tax relief. In this case, CTH measures the corrected average amount
paid by real taxpayers. For most municipalities, CTH is the e¢ cient tax
level with n = 0:2: When the residential crowding parameter is greater
than 0.3, CTH is under the optimal level. Overall, despite the imperfect
measure of congestion in the empirical literature, these preliminary results
seem to demonstrate that tax on mobile household residents should be higher
in France in order to be e¢ cient.
4 Concluding remarks
This article presents both theoretical and empirical ndings in the eld of op-
timal local taxation. The model extends Wildasins analysis (1987), including
mobile capital across jurisdictions. In this way, we recall his marginal cost of
congestion taxation rule. Furthermore, we are also able to discuss a major
new topic: the optimal share-out of taxation among household residents and
10
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capital owners in municipalities. Having developed this theory, we are able
to illustrate many of the distortions in the French municipal tax system.
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6 Appendix
Town n= 0; 1 n= 0; 2 n= 0; 5 TH CTH
Acigné 1306 2612 6530 1787 2904
Betton 1608 3217 8041 1937 3148
Brécé 1521 3041 7603 1730 2811
Bruz 1507 3014 7536 1854 3013
Cesson-Sévigné 1739 3478 8695 1309 2127
Chantepie 1665 3330 8325 1202 1953
Chapelle Fougeretz 1553 3106 7764 2071 3365
Chapelle Thouarault 1160 2320 5800 1546 2512
Chartres 2966 5931 14828 1196 1944
Chavagne 1929 2858 7144 1775 2884
Chevaigne 1381 2763 6907 1474 2395
Cintré 1743 3485 8713 1999 3248
Clayes 1318 2637 6591 1228 1996
Geveze 1673 3347 8367 1311 2130
LHermitage 1333 2665 6663 1300 2113
Montgermont 2483 2966 7416 1950 3169
Mordelles 1454 2907 7269 1688 2743
Noyal-Chatillon 1380 2759 6898 1787 2904
Noyal s/ Vilaine 1700 3400 8500 1206 1960
Pacé 1605 3210 8024 2038 3312
Parthenay 1202 2404 6009 1055 1714
Pontpéan 1033 2067 5166 1400 2275
Le Rheu 1541 3081 7703 2006 3260
StErblon 1473 2946 7365 1735 2819
StGilles 1569 3139 7846 2110 3429
StGrégoire 1829 3658 9145 1933 3141
StJacques 1397 2794 6986 1741 2829
StSulpice 1232 2463 6159 1485 2413
Thorigné 1698 3397 8492 2237 3635
Leverger 1930 3859 9648 1248 2028
Vern 1504 3007 7518 1456 2366
Vézin 1732 3463 8658 1696 2756
Rennes 1568 3137 7242 2062 3351
13
Page 13 of 13
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
